Trading spaces by Betty Joyce Nash
R
ed-cockaded woodpeckers choose real estate 
carefully. They prefer drilling cavities in old pine trees
— longleaf if they can get it — amid open space. 
A golf course, for instance. They’re picky, territorial, and
because they’re endangered, they influence private land 
transactions in a big way. They live in 10 Southeastern states
on a sliver (3 percent) of their original longleaf pine habitat.
Even after federal protection in 1973, their numbers 
continued to slide, in part because frustrated 
landowners tried to deter or get rid of the birds. Some 
cut forests before maturity to avoid woodpecker 
cavities or allowed dense hardwood growth to spoil 
foraging area under the pines. All this to avoid future 
limitations on how property owners could use their land. 
Something was very wrong with the incentives 
here: Habitat and species preservation demanded a truce.
Owners of the preferred pine tracts needed encouragement
to manage forests in a woodpecker-friendly way without 
liability. A conservation tool called Safe Harbor does that.
Landowners voluntarily agree to restore woodpecker 
habitat; in return, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service frees
them from regulatory limits should those management 
practices attract additional groups of birds beyond the 
original “baseline.” Voila — incentive.
“It removes regulatory risk and allows landowners 
to engage in practices beneficial to them and the 
woodpecker,” says Michael Bean, an attorney at
Environmental Defense, the nonprofit environmental 
group that has pioneered Safe Harbor and other 
conservation incentives.
Natural Remedy
Conservation increasingly pits private interests against 
public. Conflicts will only intensify as development 
continues to chop up open land and species habitat. 
Incentives, however, have demonstrated over the past
decade that they can turn environmental liabilities into
assets. Under some programs, farmers can sever and sell
development rights. In others, developer obligations can be
transferred to “mitigation banks” that sell credits from 
private, certified-restored natural areas. Both create 
tradable commodities. Both achieve social goals through
market enterprises.  
Such incentives can inspire landowners to maintain land
and correct the negative consequences of development.
Now, red-cockaded woodpeckers are multiplying in the
Southeast, with the help of incentive-based agreements like
Safe Harbor. The Sustainable Land Fund is ironing out
details for a mitigation bank near Elkins, W.Va., for the
threatened Cheat Mountain salamander and West Virginia
northern flying squirrel. And a market for transferable 
development rights in Maryland has preserved 17,500 acres
of farmland in Calvert County.
“We know incentives inform what landowners decide to
do with their properties, so the idea of now turning those
around and saying, ‘How can we use that same technology,
that same financial set of tools to create a longer-term, 
sustainable future?’ is by my way of thinking just an 
appropriate new mechanism we need to adopt to do more
than we can possibly do with the old tools,” says William
Ginn. He directs the Global Forest Partnership at 
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the 2005 book, Investing in Nature. 
Using market tools to achieve 
conservation goals isn’t a new idea, but
it is gaining currency as preservation
funds dwindle and regulation proves
inadequate.
Environmental regulation tries to
make up for costs that affect society,
costs that aren’t borne by firms 
or landowners, called externalities.
Like pollution. Or doing in the last
red-cockaded woodpecker. But a 
one-size-fits-all standard may not
work as envisioned. (Economists John
List, Michael Margolis, and Daniel
Osgood have written a paper suggest-
ing that the U.S. Endangered Species
Act has accelerated development,
leading to habitat and even species
decline. Property owners, the authors
argue, are forward-looking and when
they see the “act as a threat to their
development rights,” they may
respond “by developing preemptively”
that is, before restrictions imposed by
the act are applied to them.) 
The Birdie
Pinehurst, a resort in the Sandhills of
south central North Carolina, was in
on Safe Harbor from the get-go, says
Brad Kocher, vice president of
grounds and golf course management.
His interest dates back to 1995, when
the resort’s No. 8 golf course was
under construction. A shame, he
recalls thinking, that the resort couldn’t
do something to attract more birds.
“But if I did something to encourage
the species on No. 8, I [would have]
encumbered anybody within a half-
mile radius of that tree, and they were
not going to be very happy with me.”
Safe Harbor will protect landowners
from future restrictions once the orig-
inal group of birds is documented.
Owners also must enhance the habi-
tat. Pinehurst has about 11 families of 
red-cockaded woodpeckers, and has
won awards for stewardship. The
agreement extends to neighboring
properties affected if new woodpeckers
are drawn by Pinehurst habitat. 
Incentives can prompt improbable
acts: After Hurricane Fran in 1996, a
landowner reported a downed cavity
tree and insisted that a biologist drill
an artificial cavity ASAP so the wood-
peckers would stay. Today, about 100
Safe Harbor agreements cover about
50,000 acres, according to Susan Ladd
Miller of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service. And six new groups of red-
cockaded woodpeckers have settled in
the North Carolina Sandhills.
“What it did was allow us to not
just be the bad guy, the regulatory guy,
but allowed us to have positive 
relationships with these landowners,”
Miller says. Safe Harbor and other
conservation plans have inspired 
some private landowners to put 
land in conservation easements, one
adjacent to Ft. Bragg, desperate for
noise buffers and critter habitat. 
(By law, federal lands must recover
endangered species.)
Banking on Conservation
Birds can be “banked.” Two elderly
women in North Carolina needed to
sell timber to pay medical expenses
but were hindered by the discovery of
three red-cockaded woodpeckers.
Those birds were moved to Nature
Conservancy land in Sussex County,
Va. The Piney Grove Preserve, 2,700
acres of primo foraging habitat, has
twice been a mitigation bank for 
the woodpeckers.
Ralph Costa of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service brokered the deal. He
tracks the red-cockaded woodpeckers’
progress and works out agreements
with landowners all over the Southeast
— public and private. Between 100
and 200 groups of birds are growing
annually throughout the region on
public and private land, Costa 
says. Landowners must pay the 
mitigation costs.
Costa explains: “I get a phone 
call … ‘Got two groups to get off 
my property — I need the money.’ 
I give them the names of all the 
mitigation banks and contacts within
their recovery unit and that’s the end
of my involvement. At that point, they 
call the bank and negotiate the 
price. I don’t care if it’s free or a 
million dollars.” 
One cluster of birds sold for
$100,000 and went to a conservation
easement owned by the University of
South Carolina, Costa says. The birds
came from property being developed
on the coast of South Carolina. “What
drives the price [is the] value of 
the timber and/or the dirt for develop-
ment on the mitigation property,” he
says. “We have some prices floating
around right now approaching
$250,000 for a developer who has a
group they want to get rid of and it’s
because the land could be used 
for timber.” Few high-dollar groups of
woodpeckers remain on coastal high- 
dollar dirt, Costa says, making such 
transactions rare.
While such informal trades don’t
constitute a true conservation or 
mitigation bank with active trading,
that concept is gaining ground.
California established rules for the
first endangered species banks in 1995,
and in 2003, the U.S. Department of
the Interior issued guidelines. Under a
command and control system, if an
endangered species were found during
development, a protracted process
ensued that often led to piecemeal
preservation. Using endangered
species mitigation banks, an “enviro-
preneur” may buy and manage land,
gaining appropriate agency approvals.
(Those in the business say that, for
now, they’re overregulated but expect
that to diminish as the banks prove
themselves.)
A California firm, Wildlands, Inc.,
has opened seven mitigation banks
since November; the latest one 
preserves habitat for the giant garter
snake in an eight-county area near
Sacramento, Calif. Wayne White
works as a consultant for mitigation
banks, having learned the ropes during
his career with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service.
A new mitigation bank carries risk
just like any other business. You need
to know your market and how many
credits you’ll have to sell to break even
or to make a profit, White says. 
The bank improves, monitors, and
establishes an endowment to ensure
management in perpetuity. And here’s
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sell the credits?”
Conservation banks seem sound,
but they need tweaking. California’s
first bank, formed in 1995, went 
bankrupt in 2005. “Agencies and
bankers learned you have 
to have a good financial port-
folio,” White says. Since then,
state and federal wildlife 
agencies have developed tools to
monitor financial performance. 
Flexible Farmland 
in Calvert County
Perhaps the oldest conservation
incentive tool comes in the form 
of “rights” that can be sold off 
farm properties to offset additional
density elsewhere. 
From the top half of Calvert
County, Md., you can commute 
to Washington, D.C., in about 35 
minutes. This Eastern Shore county
has been a prime bedroom community
even as far back as the early 1980s.
Between 1990 and 2000, Calvert 
was the fastest-growing county 
in Maryland.
“We were one of the first to feel the
effect of the concept of a bedroom
community,” says Susan Hance-Wells.
Her family has lived on Calvert farm-
land since it was established some 300
years ago. Today, she grows corn, 
soybeans, and oats, and she breeds
Friesian horses. 
Worried about disappearing farm-
land, Hance-Wells and her father,
Maryland’s first secretary of agricul-
ture, enrolled in Calvert County’s
transferable development rights
(TDR) program back in 1979. Their
fears illustrate the externality that isn’t
accounted for by a builder — in this
case, the reduction of open space and
loss of farmland.
In a TDR market, development
potential transfers from one parcel to
another. It can be used to preserve 
natural or historic areas as well as
species habitat. Zoning, a typical 
regulatory response, often doesn’t
work the way it’s supposed to because
of what economists call “rent-seek-
ing.” If owners feel a classification
deprives them of income, they’ll 
pressure local authorities for change.
Paul Thorsnes of the University of
Otago in New Zealand and Gerald
Simons of Grand Valley State
University in Michigan have studied
the issue and written: “In short, 
however efficient the allocation of
land, the inequitable distribution 
of costs and benefits plagues open-
space zoning.” But creating a market
for development rights is preserving
land, particularly in Calvert and
Montgomery counties. 
Prices are determined through 
supply and demand, not appraisals. 
“If the builders are building, and they
need those rights to increase density in
the subdivisions, then the price goes
up,” Hance-Wells explains.
The Power of Prices
Channeling development through 
a TDR market draws on the same 
principles as free market environmen-
talism. In theory, people choose 
based on self-interest and everybody 
benefits. “Regulation to a standard
means forcing some people to be at a
position they’d rather not be,” 
says Margaret Walls, an economist 
at Resources for the Future, a
Washington, D.C., think tank.
“Whether it has to do with acres 
of land or power plant emissions, 
market-based instruments tend to
have more flexibility.”
Walls, with co-authors Virginia
McConnell and Elizabeth Kopits, 
has studied the market for 
development rights in Calvert County.
“It creates a price for selling these
rights, an incentive for people to 
preserve this land permanently,”
McConnell notes. 
One measure of a TDR program’s
success lies in trading activity,
McConnell says. “So often the 
programs are on the books but nobody
makes transactions; supply and
demand are out of whack. If the 
market works in the sense that people
are participating, then you know land 
is being preserved.”
In Calvert County, any landowner
with productive soil may enroll 
and sell TDRs. Owners also can develop
their land or buy rights and develop
beyond base zoning limits. A single
TDR preserves one land parcel.
McConnell points out that one of the
downsides to TDR programs is
adverse selection. Conceivably, some
owners sell rights who may never have
intended to sell or develop their 
property in the first place. That could
lead to more density than would occur
under a straight zoning regime.
About 142 TDR programs are
ongoing in the United States, some
more successful than others. Getting
supply and demand in sync is critical.
If people don’t know who is selling
development rights, there are problems
matching willing buyers and sellers. 
To remedy a thin market and 
price fluctuation, Calvert County
began in 1993 to buy TDRs annually 
at announced prices. They also 
now publish a newsletter to keep 
information flowing.
With the uncertainty reduced,
McConnell says, trading increased. 
Arecent study of TDRprograms found
that market stimulation through such
public purchases helps balance supply
and demand and is characteristic of 
successful  TDRmarkets.
Purchases vary from year to year
and prices have increased from 
an average of $2,500 in 2001 to $7,500
in 2005. Maryland’s TDR program 
has preserved 12,000 acres, and
Calvert County has bought 5,500 acres 
to retire permanently. Separately, 
the state has bought easements that
have preserved 7,000 acres.
Not Perfect
Critics point out, though, that devel-
opment in Calvert County sprouted in
the rural communities anyway, demon-
strating low demand for dense
residential development. While the
development pattern isn’t perfect,
flexibility may have worked to the
county’s advantage.
“A lot of programs try to dictate
that the sales go into more high-
density areas; as a result it sometimes
limits the demand for them,” 
Walls says. “TDRs are not a growth
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spatial allocation tool.”
High land prices have brought new
owners to TDRs, says Susan Hance-
Wells, but many are “farmettes” rather
than large-tract farms. “Some of the
land that will get in is not what we orig-
inally intended, but they preserve farm
communities. It’s insulating the farms
in that community against increased
density,” she says. “You’re going to have
cases that don’t suit what you’re looking
for or don’t accomplish the goals, but
they’re not going to be in the majority.”
OK, so maybe the development
isn’t ideally situated. And perhaps it
isn’t a true market, as Thorsnes 
points out, because the zones are 
predetermined by planners. But 
the fact  remains that farmland is 
being preserved.
Likewise, maybe Safe Harbor won’t
satisfy everybody, but it’s increasing
populations of the red-cockaded
woodpecker. And mitigation banks are
criticized for “enabling” development.
Yet the private banks, the successful
ones, are preserving larger sites and
providing permanent management for
endangered animals. As markets for
endangered species and open land
mature and go mainstream, they may
reveal nature’s true value. RF
year, while Ford lost $2,015 per vehicle
and GM lost $335 per vehicle.
Some industry observers argue that
if it weren’t for the cost of the jobs
bank, mass layoffs would have been
more common in the automotive indus-
try. Sean McAlinden, chief economist
at the Center for Automotive Research
in Ann Arbor, Mich., agreed with this
argument in a June 2004 report.
If the Big Three held firm on prices
during the onset of the 2001 recession,
McAlinden noted, they would 
have laid off tens of thousands of
workers who would have collected
supplementary unemployment bene-
fits and, eventually, full pay and
benefits in the jobs bank. “The 
companies, already facing pension
shortfalls, and remembering the disas-
trous cash drain of such layoffs in 
1992 for GM, cut prices instead of 
production and employment.”
This overcapacity has been partially
masked by strong sales of high-margin
trucks and sport-utility vehicles. But
continued poor sales of the Big 
Three’s cars are forcing automakers to
make more drastic changes. With or
without the jobs bank, it’s a more 
challenging environment for both
American automakers and the people
they employ. RF
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